Adults sometimes disperse while philopatric offspring inherit the natal site, a pattern known as bequeathal. Despite a decades-old empirical literature, little theoretical work has explored when natural selection may favor bequeathal. We present a simple mathematical model of the evolution of bequeathal in a stable environment, under both global and local dispersal. We find that natural selection favors bequeathal when adults 5 are competitively advantaged over juveniles, baseline mortality is high, the environment is unsaturated, and when juveniles experience high dispersal mortality. However, frequently bequeathal may not evolve, because the fitness cost for the adult is too large relative to inclusive fitness benefits. Additionally, there are many situations for which bequeathal is an ESS, yet cannot invade the population. As bequeathal in real populations appears to 10 be facultative, yet-to-be-modeled factors like timing of birth in the breeding season may strongly influence the patterns seen in natural populations. 1 occurs in nature from field studies of four mammal species: Columbian ground squirrels, Urocitellus columbianus (Harris and Murie 1984); kangaroo rats, Dipodomys spectabilis 20 (Jones 1986); red squirrels, Tamiasciurus hudsonicus (Price and Boutin 1993, Berteaux and Boutin 2000); and woodrats Neotoma macrotis (Linsdale and Tevis 1951, Cunningham 22 2005). There is also evidence that it may occur in several other species: common wombats, Vombatus ursinus (Banks et al. 2002); hairy-nosed wombats (Johnson and Crossman 1991), 24 Lasiorhinus krefftii; plateau pika (Zhang et al. 2017) Ochotona curzoniae; and wolverines (Aronsson and Persson 2018), Gulo gulo. Bequeathal has deep similarities with cooperative 26 breeding and philopatric queuing (Kokko and Johnstone 1999, Kokko and Ekman 2002, Clutton-Brock 2006) in that related individuals cooperate to improve fitness outcomes, and 28 juveniles stand to inherit the natal territory. The difference is that bequeathal does not involve group co-residence, and the costs of cooperation are paid by the dispersing adult 30 rather than the offspring. Nonetheless, bequeathing adults often disperse short distances to nearby sites, where proximity to kin creates additional opportunities for cooperative 32 behavior to evolve. In this light, bequeathal can be viewed as a type of cooperative breeding, and is part of the spectrum of strategies that help us understand the evolution of natal 34 philopatry and kin cooperation (Clutton-Brock and Lukas 2012). Despite bequeathal being empirically observed for nearly 70 years (Linsdale and Tevis 36 1951), there is no theoretical framework to explain its presence and absence. While natal dispersal is relatively well studied (Ronce 2007, Clobert et al. 2012), developing a greater 38 understanding of bequeathal can teach us about the other side of the same behavioral coin, and adds a new dimension to our understanding of breeding dispersal (Paradis et al. 40 1998, Johst and Brandl 1999, Harts et al. 2016). Studying the exceptions to the norm in evolutionary ecology is often illuminating and can provide fresh insights into well-studied 42 biological processes. As dispersal is a fundamental driver affecting the ecology, evolution, and population persistence of organisms (Bowler and Benton 2005), understanding the 44 conditions which favor particular types of dispersal is of much importance.
Introduction
In this paper, we develop the first evolutionary models of bequeathal. Bequeathal is a 16 type of breeding dispersal which occurs when a parent disperses to a new site, leaving a philopatric offspring to inherit the natal site and its resources. We know bequeathal to interpret. Bequeathal, as a special form of dispersal, is inherently game theoretic, generating powerful frequency dependence. A game-theoretic model by Kokko and Lundberg 80 (2001) comes closest to our target, in that it examines dispersal from and competition for territorial breeding sites, combined with conflict between an adult and a single offspring. 82 However, their model examined residency in seasonal habitats with different productivity and survivorship, and it failed to find any bequeathal-like pattern among the evolutionarily 84 stable strategies.
As a first step to building a theoretical framework for bequeathal, we present a simple 86 bequeathal model. Our model considers parent-offspring conflict, competition for territories, local and global dispersal, and survival rates of adults and juveniles with overlapping 88 generations. Like Kokko and Lundberg (2001), we consider production of a single offspring to avoid complications arising from sibling competition. This assumption is unrealistic in 90 many cases, but allows for understanding of other factors before advancing to more complicated models. Unlike Kokko and Lundberg (2001) but like Hamilton and May (1977) , we 92 study a stable, uniform habitat, in order to eliminate many well-studied causes of dispersal in spatially and temporally variable environments. This is also unrealistic, but again allows 94 for understanding the basic evolutionary logic of bequeathal, before studying it in stochastic environments, in which dispersal may be favored for other reasons. 96 A great deal of work remains to be done, extending these first models to consider facultative responses and additional strategies such as reproductive queuing. Still, even the 98 simple models we analyze here are capable of producing a number of surprising dynamics.
Therefore they are worth understanding in themselves before productive work can begin on 100 extending them.
The major result of our analysis is that bequeathal is favored by the comparative ad-102 vantage adults have in competing for sites. This advantage arises because there is more competition to acquire a new site than to retain an existing site. Since adults are better 104 competitors, comparative advantage favors sending the better warrior to the most difficult battle. However, inclusive fitness considerations tend to work against bequeathal. Under 106 clonal reproduction, the adult and juvenile will agree that the best warrior serve in the harshest battle. But since adults and juveniles are imperfectly related, they disagree, under 108 some range of costs and benefits. Any factor that reduces the adult's costs will therefore help bequeathal evolve. Such factors include adults having high mortality risk and low 110 residual reproductive value, such as at the end of life. Conversely, any factor that reduces ing high baseline mortality, then it makes little sense to bequeath territory to them. We outline the mathematical argument that leads to these conclusions, ending the paper with 114 a discussion of un-modeled factors that may also strongly influence the facultative use of bequeathal in natural populations. 116 
Model definition
We use a mix of methods-including formal analysis, numerical sensitivity analysis, and 118 individual-based simulation-to construct and understand our models of bequeathal. We begin by defining the global and local dispersal models analytically. Table 1 summarizes model, in which all individuals arriving or residing at a site simultaneously compete for it. 162 Adults have an advantage over juveniles in competition, and we express this advantage as a relative advantage C A > 1. The probability that an adult retains or occupies a site with 164 n A other adult competitors and n J juvenile competitors is:
. B. Let R be the proportion of sites with a resident adult, at the start of each breeding season. The goal is to compute the probability n A adults and n J juveniles immigrate to a 174 particular site. Under the assumption that dispersal events are independent of one another, the probability that n A adults and n J juveniles arrive at a particular site will be multinomial 176 with three categories (adult, juvenile, none) and N − 1 trials. As the number of sites N grows large, the distribution approaches a bivariate Poisson, just like a binomial distribution 178 with low probability approaches univariate Poisson as the number of trials becomes large. Therefore in the limit N → ∞:
is the average number of immigrants (either adult or juvenile) entering the site, n = n A + n J , and
is the proportion of the surviving dispersal pool that is adult. Pr(n A , n J ) is just a special case of a multivariate Poisson process, with uncorrelated dimensions. But it can be motivated 184 more easily by considering that dispersal events are independent Poisson samples that are equally likely to arrive at the focal site. Whether a disperser is adult or juvenile can then be 186 viewed as a binomial process, independent of arrival. Note that were adults and juveniles to use different dispersal strategies, varying in distance or some other aspect, then some 188 other function would be required.
The expected residency rate R is dynamic, but quickly reaches a steady state expectation.
190
The steady state of R is defined implicitly by the recurrence:
where R t is the proportion of sites that are occupied at time t and Pr(A|O) is the probability 
The juvenile stays at the site, competing with n A adult immigrants and n J juvenile immi-202 grants. The juvenile survives the season with probability s J .
The other component of fitness is the probability of acquiring the away site to which the 204 adult disperses. This is:
If the bequeathing adult survives dispersal, it competes with a resident R of the time, in 206 addition to another n A adult immigrants and n J juvenile immigrants. Since the number of sites is very large, the distribution of immigrants here is the same as before, not conditional 208 on the focal immigrant, because dispersal events are independent in the Poisson process. If the number of sites were small, or dispersal were local, this would not be true, as we explain 210 later.
Finally, we devalue fitness from the offspring, due to imperfect inheritance. This gives us 212 inclusive fitness:
where ρ is the coefficient of relatedness between the adult and juvenile. For a typical 214 example, this would be ρ = 0.5. But for a maternally inherited trait, it might be ρ = 1.
The fitness expression for the Stay strategy is constructed similarly:
where:
.
Note that while the expressions W (B) and W (S) are presented as inclusive fitness ex- It is possible, however, to completely define the model for invading B and invading S, that is for p ≈ 0 and p ≈ 1. This allows us to conduct standard ESS analysis, even though we will 230 not be able to find the location of any internal equilibria. This turns out to be sufficient for this model. But we have also verified all of these inferences using individual-based 238 Whether there are one or two "coins" to flip depends upon our focus. When focusing on a home site, there are two neighbors who may contribute immigrants. But when focusing 240 on an away site, the focal disperser counts as one of the neighbors, and so there is only one "coin" to flip. With these facts in mind, we can define inclusive fitness much as before.
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The expressions add little insight in themselves, and so we include them only in the appendix. The Mathematica notebook in the Supplemental contains all of these expressions and 244 computes fitness differences from them.
Model Results

246
There are two antagonistic forces that strongly influence when Bequeath can be an ESS.
The first is the comparative advantage that adults have in competition. This advantage 248 favors Bequeath. The second force, opposed to the first, is the conflict of interest between parent and offspring that arises from sexual reproduction. Baseline survival, dispersal 250 survival, and dispersal pattern (local or global) all interact with these two forces.
Even a model as simple as this one is very complex. Therefore we explain these two 252 antagonistic forces first, without reference to dispersal pattern or baseline and dispersal survival rates. We consider how local and global dispersal differ, through their effects on 254 comparative advantage and conflict of interest. Then we vary adult and juvenile survival rates to show how they interact with adult comparative advantage and parent-offspring 256 conflict of interest.
3.1. Bequeathal is favored by comparative advantage. Assume for the moment that 258 s A = s J = 1 and that d A = d J = 1 so that there is no baseline nor dispersal mortality.
As can be seen by substituting these values in Equation 3, these assumptions imply that 260 all sites are always occupied (R = 1), a saturated environment. Figure 1 illustrates the nature of invasion and stability under these conditions. Each of the four diagrams in 262 Figure 1 illustrates movement from and into a focal "home" site for a rare invader, as well as movement from and to an "away" site the invader attempts to claim. This is a 264 cartoonish representation of the full model, but will serve to explain the basic forces in the model, before moving on to nuances. to acquire the away site, the lone juvenile disperser competes with a juvenile resident and, on average, 1 adult immigrant. Therefore there is one additional competitor at the away site, 280 and the juvenile must contend with its disadvantage against an adult (assuming C A > 1).
So, Stay sends its juvenile to an away site at which it must compete against, on average, 282 one additional juvenile. Also, any competitive advantage of adults hurts Stay, because as C A increases, the chance of acquiring the away site decreases. For very large C A , the only 284 way for a S juvenile to acquire an away site is for no adults to immigrate.
The situation is nearly reversed when Bequeath invades, as shown in Figure 1 have no conflict of interest. When ρ = 1, there is no conflict of interest, and selection favors allocating the adult to the more dangerous away site. The adult and juvenile always agree.
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But for ρ < 1, there is a conflict of interest, with bequeathal representing a costly action by the adult. As ρ gets smaller, selection favors adults choosing the easier battle, which is always the home site. However, large C A can compensate, allowing B to continue to be stable, even when ρ is so small that B can no longer invade the population.
312
To appreciate how conflict of interest and comparative advantage interact, in Figure 2 we map regions of stability for B and S for combinations of ρ and C A . Focus for now on 314 only the upper-left, panel (a), the enlarged plot with labeled regions. The horizontal axis is the magnitude of C A , expressed as the base-2 logarithm, a "fold" value. If you folded a 316 piece of paper in half 10 times, then its thickness would be 2 10 layers, a 10-fold increase in thickness. Likewise you can read the value log 2 C A = 10 as a 10-fold increase in adult Bequeath does better the more common it becomes, because the away site becomes easier to win, reducing the costliness of adult dispersal.
350
The boundaries for global and local dispersal, shown by the solid and dashed curves, sometimes differ greatly. The major effect of local dispersal is to make it harder for either internal equilibrium lies at the intersection of these two isoclines, near p = 0.3, R t = 0.28.
452
We are not sure what to predict, given the existence of these mixed equilibria. On the one hand, this dynamic may be an unlikely outcome in natural populations, as the parameter 454 combinations that make it possible are rare. On the other hand, nature does not randomly sample from parameter spaces. Instead, dispersal costs and baseline mortality evolve. In 456 addition, drift may be a substantial force in natural populations, and drift will interact with selection in these models, because selection alters the habitat saturation and may decrease 458 effective population size.
Regardless, the existence of these mixed equilibria sheds light on the general conditions 460 that favor both B and S, and therefore aids in understanding dispersal strategy more generally. Specifically, we are struck by how hard we had to search to find mixed equilibria in 462 these models. Unless dispersal and mortality are tuned in precise ways, selection will not favor a mix of B and S. 
Discussion
We have developed and analyzed two very simple models of bequeathal. In the first, 466 dispersal is global and random. In the second, dispersal is local and random. In both models, a single adult breeder occupies a site and produces a single juvenile offspring.
468
Genes in the adult determine whether it evicts the juvenile, forcing it to disperse, or rather bequeaths the site to the juvenile, dispersing itself. Both adults and juveniles must compete Based on our results, bequeathal is most likely to be adaptive under the following condi-476 tions.
(1) In unsaturated habitat. An unsaturated environment, with vacant breeding sites, 478 reduces the competition a bequeathing adult faces.
(2) When adults easily defeat juveniles in contests for breeding sites. Our models make 480 no distinction between experience-related and size-related competitive advantages.
(3) When adults are superior to juveniles in dispersal survival. Our models do not 482 address whether superior survival is due to greater knowledge of the habitat or greater experience avoiding predation or even greater body size.
484
(4) When adults have less residual reproductive value than their offspring. This can be true for example when an adult is less likely to survive to breed a second time than 486 a juvenile is to survive to adulthood.
These conditions do not seem too restrictive, and indeed all of them have been suggested in 488 the empirical literature as conditions that may favor bequeathal. As described in the Model Results section, these conditions are interactive and can sometimes counteract one another.
490
Our analysis also finds many situations in which bequeathal does not evolve, even when these conditions are satisfied (for empirical examples that fail to detect bequeathal see 492 Lambin (1997), Selonen and Wistbacka (2017)). The major reason is that bequeathal is a cooperative behavior that may impose substantial fitness costs on the adult. As a result, 494 often even when bequeathal is adaptive-can be maintained by natural selection-it may not be able to invade the population. For most of the parameter space in our models, 496 bequeathal is most challenged when it is rare. This positive frequency dependence creates large regions in which both bequeathal and juvenile dispersal are evolutionarily stable, 498 making it hard to know what to predict.
Prediction is made more challenging once we remember that models of this sort are rarely 500 valuable for their direct quantitative predictions. As the first formal models of bequeathal, these had to be simple to be productive. Despite their simplicity, they exhibit complex 502 dynamics that demonstrate the basic tradeoffs inherent in bequeathal, tradeoffs that are likely to operate in more-complex models as well as in real populations. . Models without explicit plasticity can sometimes be usefully interpreted as guides to plastic response. There are also risks that plasticity will generate novel feedback. In that case, attempting to interpret evolutionary dynamics as behavioral dynamics may frustrate 510 and confuse. Still, it is useful to consider facultative interpretations of our results, as it helps to integrate our models with the existing literature, as well as guide future theorizing. 512 We have assumed that adult competitive ability, C A , is constant across individuals. If instead adults vary in competitive ability, and have some knowledge of it, then dispersal 514 strategy may be contingent. We found that bequeathal is favored and easier to maintain when C A is large, suggesting that larger and more aggressive individuals might do better 
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Provided adults enjoy higher dispersal survival than do juveniles, facultative bequeathal following disturbance or an increase in baseline mortality may allow a population to rescue 528 itself. This is because habitat saturation would be higher under bequeathal than under juvenile dispersal. Such a mechanism can work in our models. If it can also function in nat-530 ural populations, even rare bequeathal following disturbance may be ecologically important, because it will allow populations to persist in otherwise challenging habitats.
532
Bequeathal may also be a facultative strategy at end of life (Descamps et al. 2007). We found that when adults experience higher baseline mortality than do juveniles, selection 534 tends to favor bequeathal. This is because an adult with low survival expectation has low residual reproductive value. In more complex life histories, where for example the survival 536 probability changes with age, it might be possible that young adults will be selected to evict offspring, while older adults are selected to bequeath. Our models deliberately studied reproduction of a single offspring, so that we could study bequeathal in the absence of sibling rivalry and the greatly enlarged strategy space that must arise once families can be of any size. Some of the species for which bequeathal has been observed do tend to have small litters frequently with only a single offspring surviving 576 each season (e.g., woodrats McEachern et al. (2009) ). However, many animals have larger litters/broods. It may be that bequeathal is likely to be rare in species with large litters, 578 because of reduced offspring viability, the conflicts of interest that arise among siblings, as well as an expected increase in habitat saturation. To explore these ideas, we envision an 580 expanded strategy space in which adults both evict a certain number of offspring (from zero to all) as well as determine whether the adult itself disperses (bequeaths). The bequeathal 582 strategy studied in this case would correspond to adult dispersal and eviction of all but one offspring from the natal site. However many other dispersal patterns would be possible 584 within this strategy space, including total eviction with adult residency and all-but-one eviction with adult residency.
586
A feature of bequeathal in many species is that a durable resource-often a den, burrow, or cache-is bequeathed together with the territory. Our models ignored the construction 588 and persistence of such resources. Presumably there is some cost of building a den, and if adults are better able to afford these costs, then our models may underestimate bequeathal's 590 adaptiveness. As a first sketch of a model with dynamic site resources, suppose that each site is also characterized by the presence or absence of a den. When a site has a resident, 592 a den can be maintained. In the absence of a resident, a den has a probability of decaying.
A den can be constructed at a site at a fitness cost k A for adults and k J for juveniles, 594 where k A < k J . We think this model could be analytically specified under global dispersal, generating a three dimensional dynamical system in which the frequency of bequeathal, the 596 residency rate, and the proportion of sites with dens would all evolve together. , for p = 0
, for p = 1
, for p = 0
Inclusive fitness is defined identically to the global dispersal model, using the probabilities above: Poisson probability:
The probability that a mutant S adult retains a home site is now:
And the probability the dispersing juvenile S acquires the away site is:
These expressions, and their sum, are not so easy to evaluate for any C A > 1. But we can inspect 658 the limits and still deduce that B is an ESS for any C A > 1. First, consider when C A = 1. Then: which sums to less than 1. Since the effect of increasing C A on Pr(away|S) is to reduce it, B is an 662 ESS for any C A > 1.
A similar argument proves that B can always invade a population of S, under the same conditions.
664
Local dispersal. The probability that a mutant S adult retains a home site is:
Pr(n A ) C A C A + n A C A = 1 4 (1) + 1 2 1 2 + 1 4 1 3 .
And the probability the S juvenile acquires an away site is:
Pr(n A ) 1 2 + n A C A = 1 2 1 2 + 1 2
Under asexual reproduction, mutant fitness is just the sum of these two expressions. This sum is never greater than 1-resident fitness-provided C A > 1. Therefore B is an ESS.
668
A similar argument shows that B can always invade S, under the same conditions.
Bequeathal is an ESS under sexual reproduction, provided C A is large enough. 670 Global dispersal. When ρ < 1, B is not an ESS for any C A > 1. But B is an ESS for C A → ∞. To demonstrate this result, assume again d A = d J = s A = s J = 1. As a result, again R = 1. However, 672 now assume 0 < ρ < 1. Resident fitness will not be 1 now, but instead some fraction of 1, as offspring fitness is discounted by ρ. So we must calculate both resident and invader fitness.
674
A resident B juvenile retains home site with probability:
And a resident B adult acquires an away site with probability:
676
And resident B inclusive fitness is given by W (B) = ρ Pr(home|B) + Pr(away|B). Invader fitness is as in the previous section, but with inclusive fitness W (S) = Pr(home|S) + ρ Pr(away|S).
678
Consider first when C A = 1. Taking limits, resident fitness is: lim CA→1 W (B) = ρ exp(1) − 1 exp(1) + exp(−1).
And likewise for the invader: 
Since (exp(1) − 1)/ exp(1) > exp(−1), W (S) > W (B) for any ρ < 1. Therefore B is never an ESS, when C A = 1 and ρ < 1. A similar argument demonstrates that S is always an ESS under the same 682 conditions. Now consider when C A → ∞. Again, taking limits: Therefore B is an ESS, once C A is sufficiently large. We cannot prove analytically how large C A 686 must be to cross the threshold required to make B an ESS. But we can be sure such a threshold exists, as the effect of C A on the probabilities of winning sites is monotonic.
688
Local dispersal. In the case of local dispersal, an exact condition can be derived. B is an ESS, provided: 690 ρ > 14 + C A (25 + C A (1 − 4C A )) 3(4 + C A (7 + C A )) .
Unfortunately, nothing can be gained by inspecting this inequality directly, aside from noting that 
